COMMENT: Marty,
The Lusitania was a British passenger ship carrying 128 Americans (out of 1,198 total deaths). The attack provoked outrage in the U.S., but President Woodrow Wilson initially sought a diplomatic response rather than war. Germany argued the ship was carrying munitions (which was true, though it was primarily a passenger liner). The US was using civilians as cover for arms transfer to Britain when they pretended to be neutral. As shown here, the Germans even took an advertisement in the NY newspaper warning people not to sail on the Lusitania. Following international pressure, Germany temporarily halted unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 to avoid further provoking the U.S.
Zimmermann Telegram & Final Push to War (1917):
The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 (sinking U.S. ships) and the Zimmermann Telegram (a secret German proposal for Mexico to ally against the U.S.) were the final triggers for U.S. entry into WWI in April 1917.
The Lusitania was a significant factor in shifting U.S. opinion against Germany because it was carrying civilians. Still, it was not the sole reason for the United States’ entry into the war. The combination of continued submarine attacks and the Zimmermann Telegram ultimately led to the U.S. declaring war in 1917.
My main point about the Lusitania is that it was a Neocon quasi-false flag. After years of denying the German claims, the government lied as always to get us into every war. The CIA and Pentagon did not exist during the Lusitania incident. The relevant U.S. agencies were the State, Navy, and War Departments. These departments, particularly the State Department under William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925), were aware of and concerned about the British practice of carrying munitions on passenger ships.
The two members of Wilson’s Cabinet who were in a position over the question of war were the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels (1862-1948), who was the last member of the cabinet to advocate for war in 1917, and the Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison (1764-1932), the Neocon who was replaced after the Lusitania. There is no evidence that Secretary of War Lindley Garrison authorized or had any direct involvement in the munitions shipment aboard the Lusitania. His department (War) was responsible for the Army, not naval shipping or maritime commerce.
The decision to load munitions on passenger liners like the Lusitania was a British Admiralty policy aimed at utilizing fast liners for vital war supplies while maintaining passenger service to generate revenue and improve public perception, thereby covering up their shipments. US covert involvement was limited to customs oversight and the controversial policy of allowing passengers on ships carrying munitions.
Garrison was a strong advocate for military preparedness before and after the sinking of the Lusitania. He advocated for building up the U.S. Army and National Guard to be ready for potential threats. His “Preparedness Movement” gained momentum after the Lusitania, much like Homeland Security was born from the WTC 911 attack. While Wilson pushed for neutrality and diplomatic responses even after the sinking, Garrison’s Neocon views clashed with Wilson and congressional leaders who felt his plans were too ambitious or militaristic. Garrison was compelled to resign in February 1916 primarily over disagreements with Wilson and Congress regarding the scale and control of military expansion. He had wanted a standing army of 140,000, which he called the Continental Army Plan, vs. strengthening the National Guard. The sinking of the Lusitania hardened attitudes towards Germany among many Americans.
While the sinking of the Lusitania caused massive outrage, shifted public opinion significantly against Germany, and led to demands for a strong diplomatic or even military response, it set in motion the calls to enter war and blamed the Germans as they hid the covert use of civilians to disguise the US violating its pretended neutrality position. By itself, it was not the final act to compel the US to enter the war. Secretary of War Garrison was pushing for a standing army. Garrison advocated for intervention using military force overseas, clashing with Wilson. This surfaced regarding Mexico. Garrison advocated for American intervention in the Mexican Revolution to restore order. In 1916, Garrison supported a plan for expanding the US military, which he referred to as the Continental Army Plan. Garrison’s proposal would establish a standing army of 140,000 and a national, volunteer reserve force of 400,000 men. Garrison encountered opposition from those who believed his plan went too far in establishing a large standing army. Allies in Congress convinced Wilson to back an alternative strategy which emphasized not Garrison’s national volunteer force, but a continued role for the states’ National Guard. Garrison resigned in February 1916 over these differences. Garrison’s public stance was that of a Neocon. He left office nearly a full year before the US actually declared war in April 1917.
While the U.S. government publicly downplayed the munitions cargo initially to maintain moral outrage against Germany, there’s no credible evidence, as always, that U.S. departments lied to President Wilson about its existence. Secretary Bryan claimed he actively warned Wilson because he believed munitions were present and made the ship a target. With the Germans taking out newspaper advertisements warning against sailing on the Lusitania, it is hard to imagine that there were no conversations, even at the Presidential level.
There was no specific Senate or House investigation focused solely on whether President Woodrow Wilson knew about the munitions aboard the RMS Lusitania before it was sunk in 1915. However, the issue was examined within broader contexts by other official U.S. bodies and touched upon in congressional hearings. Just as the investigations into whether FDR knew in advance about Pearl Harbor, no such committee will EVER admit the wrongdoing by the President that took the country into war.
Congress did not even launch a formal investigation specifically targeting Wilson’s foreknowledge of the Lusitania’s cargo. While there was significant public debate and congressional interest in the sinking and its role in pushing the U.S. toward war, no committee was empaneled with the primary purpose of investigating the President’s prior awareness of the munitions. They too, conspired to cover up the foreknowledge.
The Mayer Arbitration (1915) was formed shortly after the sinking. The U.S. government initiated an investigation led by federal judge Julius Mayer, who was from the Second Circuit in New York City. He had presided over cases dealing with the Titanic. While primarily focused on establishing facts for potential legal claims against Germany, the investigation confirmed the Lusitania was carrying small-arms ammunition, claiming that they were non-explosive rifle cartridges and artillery shell casings (shrapnel shells without explosive charges). This information became part of the official record, meaning the government (including the administration) knew about the munitions after the sinking, but the investigation didn’t address what Wilson knew beforehand.
In the US, there were 67 claims for compensation filed against Cunard, which were all heard together in 1918 before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Julius Mayer as well. In the Titanic case, he had ruled in favour of the shipping company. Mayer had a reputation for being pro-government in matters of national interest. The two sides agreed before the jury trial that no question would be raised regarding whether Lusitania had been armed or carrying troops or ammunition as part of the cover-up. Evidence produced by the British was presented only behind closed doors. The Defence of the Realm Act was invoked to protect British witnesses, ensuring that the truth would not be heard.
The decision was rendered on August 23rd, 1918, and Mayer’s judgement was that “the cause of the sinking was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government”, that two torpedoes had been involved, that the captain had acted properly, and emergency procedures had been up to the standard then expected. He ruled that further claims for compensation should be addressed to the German government (which eventually paid $2.5 million in 1925).
After WWI, this U.S.-German commission handled claims arising from the war, including those related to the Lusitania. Its findings (1923) explicitly stated that the presence of non-explosive munitions did not deprive the Lusitania’s passengers of their neutral rights or justify the attack without warning. Crucially, it found no evidence that the ship carried high explosives (like the German government claimed). Again, this established the nature of the cargo officially but didn’t investigate Wilson’s prior knowledge.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in 1916 on broader issues of preparedness and neutrality, leading up to the war. While the Lusitania was discussed, the focus was not on Wilson’s foreknowledge of its specific cargo. Critics of the administration questioned why Americans were allowed to travel on belligerent ships carrying contraband. Still, the hearings did not yield evidence or conclusions regarding Wilson’s personal knowledge before May 7, 1915.
Only during the 1030s, the Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry (Nye Committee) investigated the arms industry and its influence on U.S. entry into World War I. It extensively documented the shipment of war materials (including those on the Lusitania) by U.S. companies to the Allies, often facilitated by the State Department despite U.S. neutrality. While it highlighted Wilson’s administration’s general awareness of and involvement in the arms trade with the Allies, it did not specifically focus on whether Wilson knew the Lusitania specifically carried munitions on that voyage before it sailed.
The U.S. government, particularly the State Department and Customs officials, was generally aware that British liners, such as the Lusitania, sometimes carried small arms and non-explosive munitions under the guise of passenger service, exploiting loopholes in neutrality rules. The government did everything it could to claim that President Wilson had no credible evidence that he received specific, advance warning about the exact nature and quantity of the munitions loaded onto the Lusitania for its final voyage before it sailed from New York. This was even though the German Embassy in Washington did place newspaper ads warning passengers that ships flying the British flag in the war zone were subject to destruction, but this was a general warning, not specific intelligence about the Lusitania’s cargo.
Wilson’s public stance after the sinking focused relentlessly on the illegality of attacking a passenger vessel without warning and the loss of civilian life, deliberately downplaying the munitions issue to maintain the moral high ground against Germany. While the fact that the Lusitania carried munitions was established by U.S. investigations after the sinking, and the broader policy of allowing munitions shipments to the Allies was controversial and later scrutinized (notably by the Nye Committee), there was never a dedicated Senate or House investigation specifically targeting President Wilson’s personal foreknowledge of the Lusitania’s cargo before its fateful voyage. Historians generally agree he likely knew such ships could carry contraband, but lacked specific, timely intelligence about the Lusitania’s final manifest.
